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ON NON-UNIQUENESS IN MEAN FIELD GAMES
ERHAN BAYRAKTAR AND XIN ZHANG
Abstract. We analyze an N + 1-player game and the corresponding mean field game with state
space {0, 1}. The transition rate of j-th player is the sum of his control αj plus a minimum jumping
rate η. Instead of working under monotonicity conditions, here we consider an anti-monotone
running cost. We show that the mean field game equation may have multiple solutions if η < 1
2
.
We also prove that that although multiple solutions exist, only the one coming from the entropy
solution is charged (when η = 0), and therefore resolve a conjecture of [9].
1. Introduction
The theory of mean field games (MFGs) was introduced recently (2006-2007) independently by
Lasry, Lions (see [12], [13], [14]) and Caines, Huang, Malhame´ (see [10], [11]). It is an analysis
of limit models for symmetric weakly interacting N + 1-player differential games; see e.g. [3], [4].
The solution of MFGs provides an approximated Nash Equilibrium. It also under some conditions
follows that MFGs are limit points of N + 1-player Nash equilibria.
The influential work [2] by Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry, and Lions established the convergence
of closed loop equilibria using the the so-called master equation, which is a partial differential
equation with terminal conditions whose variable are time, state and measure. It is known that
under the monotonicity condition, the master equation possess a unique solution, which is used
to show the above convergence. A similar analysis was carried in finite state mean field games by
Bayraktar and Cohen [1] and Cecchin and Pelino [5] independently obtain the above convergence
result (as well as the the analysis of its fluctuations).
In this paper, we consider a case when the monotonicity assumption is not satisfied and resolve a
conjecture of [9], in which a two-state mean field game with Markov feedback strategies is analyzed.
In this game the transition rate of each player is the sum of his control and a background jump rate
η ≥ 0. Supposing an anti-monotone running cost (follow the crowd game), [9] poses a conjecture on
the nature of the limits of N + 1-player Nash equilibrium. We proceed by using similar techniques
to [6], which considers an anti-monotone terminal condition. In particular, we again rely on the
entropy solution of the master equation to prove the convergence and show that the limit of N +1-
player Nash equilibrium selects the unique mean field equilibrium induced by this entropy solution.
In [6], they showed that the mean field game equation has at most three equations, while in our
model if η < 12 , the number of solutions is increasing with time horizon and can be arbitrarily large.
Also, the entropy solution in our case cannot be written down explicitly, and so we need to construct
using the characteristics and check that it is entropic. Let us also mention the recent work by [7],
where they study linear-quadratic mean field games in the diffusion setting. To re-establish the
uniqueness of MFG solutions, they add a common noise and prove that the limit of MFG solutions
as noise tends to zero is just the solution induced by the entropy solution of the master equation
without common noise.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the N + 1-player game we are
considering, and introduce the equations characterizing the mean field equilibria. In Section 3, we
show that the forward backward equation characterizing the mean field game possesses a unique
solution if η ≥ 12 , may have multiple solutions if η < 12 . Furthermore, we also determine the
number of solutions. In Section 4, we explicitly find the entropy solution of the master equation.
In Section 5, we show that if η = 0 each player in the N + 1-player game will follow the majority
and briefly present that the optimal trajectories of N + 1-player game converges to the optimal
trajectory induced by the entropy solution of the master equation.
2. Two states mean field games
We consider the N +1-players game with state space Σ = {0, 1}, and denote the state of players
by Z(t) := (Zj(t))
N+1
j=1 , which evolves as controlled Markov processes. The jump rate of Zj(t) is
given by αj(t,Z(t)) + η, where αj : [0, T ]×ΣN+1 → [0,+∞) is the control of player j and η ≥ 0 is
the minimum jump rate, i.e.,
P[Zj(t+ h) = 1− i|Zj(t) = i] = (αj(t,Z(t)) + η)h+ o(h).
Denote by A the collection of all the measurable and locally integrable functions [0, T ]× ΣN+1 →
[0,+∞), and by αN+1 = (α1, . . . , αN+1) ∈ AN+1 the control of all players. It is can be easily seen
that the law of Markov process is determined by the control vector αN+1.
Let the empirical measure of player j at time t to be
θN+1,j(t) =
1
N
N+1∑
k=1,k 6=j
δZk(t)=0.
Then given the running cost function
(2.1) f(i, θ) = |1− θ − i| =
{
1− θ i = 0
θ i = 1,
the control vector αN+1 ∈ AN+1 and it is associated Markov process (Z(t))0≤t≤T , the objective
function of the k-th player is defined by
JN+1k (α
N+1) = E
[ ∫ T
0
f(Zk(t), θ
N+1,k(t)) +
αk(t,Z(t))
2
dt
]
For a control vector αN+1 ∈ AN+1 and β ∈ A, define the perturbed control vector by
[αN+1,−j ;β]k :=
{
αk, k 6= j
β, k = j.
Definition 2.1. A control vector αN+1 ∈ AN+1 is a Nash Equilibrium if for any k = 1, . . . , N +1
JN+1k (α
N+1) = inf
β∈A
JN+1k ([α
N+1,−;β]).
To find the Nash equilibrium, it is standard to solve its corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equations
for value functions V N+1(t, i, θ), i = 0, 1 (see e.g. [8]).
(HJB)


− d
dt
V N+1(t, i, θ) = f(i, θ)− (αN+1∗ (t,i,θ))22
+η(V N+1(t, 1− i, θ)− V N+1(t, i, θ))
+N(1− θ)
(
αN+1∗ (t, 1, θ +
1−i
N
) + η
)
(V N+1(t, 1, θ + 1
N
)− V N+1(t, 1, θ))
+Nθ
(
αN+1∗ (t, 0, θ − iN ) + η
)
(V N+1(t, 1, θ − 1
N
)− V N+1(t, 1, θ)),
V N+1(T, i, θ) = 0,
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where the optimal control is given by
aN+1∗ (t, i, θ) = (V
N+1(t, i, θ)− V N+1(t, 1− i, θ))+.
It is also easy to write down the corresponding mean field game equation,
(MFG)


d
dt
θ(t) = (1− θ(t))((u(t, 1) − u(t, 0))+ + η)− θ(t)((u(t, 0) − u(t, 1))+ + η),
− d
dt
u(t, i) = f(i, θ)− η(u(t, i) − u(t, 1 − i))− ((u(t,i)−u(t,1−i))+)22 ,
θ(0) = θ¯,
u(T, i) = 0,
and see e.g. [8] and the corresponding master equation, the corresponding master equation,
(ME)


− ∂
∂t
U(t, i, θ) = f(i, θ)− [(U(t,i,θ)−U(t,1−i,θ)+]22 + η(U(t, 1 − i, θ)− U(t, i, θ))
+ ∂
∂θ
U(t, i, θ)((U(t, 1, θ) − U(t, 0, θ)+ + η)(1 − θ)
− ∂
∂θ
U(t, i, θ)((U(t, 0, θ) − U(t, 1, θ)+ + η)θ,
U(T, i, θ) = 0,
see Bayraktar, Cohen [1] and Cecchin, Pelino [5]. Recall from the latter two references that the
uniqueness of (MFG) and (ME) is guaranteed by the so-called monotonicity condition, i.e., for
every θ, θ
′ ∈ [0, 1], ∑
i=0,1
(f(i, θ)− f(i, θ′))(θ − θ′) ≥ 0,
which does not hold true with our choice of running cost.
3. non-uniqueness
We show that the mean field equations (MFG) may have multiple solutions. Taking
y(t) = u(t, 1) − u(t, 0), x(t) = 2θ(t)− 1,
then (MFG) becomes
(3.1)


d
dt
x = y − x|y| − 2ηx
− d
dt
y = x− 12y|y| − 2ηy
y(T ) = 0, x(0) = 2θ¯ − 1.
The second one of (3.1) is equivalent to
(3.2) x =
1
2
y|y|+ 2ηy − d
dt
y.
Taking derivative with respect to t in (3.2) and in conjunction with (3.1), we obtain
(3.3)
d2
dt2
y + y − 1
2
y3 − 3η|y|y − 4η2y = 0.
For simplicity, we time reverse the system and try to solve
(3.4)


d2
dt2
y + y − 12y3 − 3η|y|y − 4η2y = 0
1
2y(T )|y(T )| + 2ηy(T ) + ddty(T ) = x(T ) = 2θ¯ − 1
y(0) = 0.
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Since (3.4) contains only the y variable, it can be uniquely solved if imposing the initial conditions
y(0) = 0, d
dt
y(0) = v, and we denote its C1 solution as yv(.). Therefore the number of solutions to
(3.4) is just the number of initial velocity v such that 2θ¯ − 1 = xv(T ), where for any t ≥ 0
(3.5) xv(t) :=
1
2
yv(t)|yv(t)|+ 2ηyv(T ) + d
dt
yv(t)
We rewrite the differential equation as a derivative with respect to y instead of t, i.e.,
d2y
dt2
=
d
dt
(
1
2
(
dy
dt
)2
)
dt
dy
=
d
dy
(
1
2
(
dt
dy
)−2
)
.
We can therefore get an implicit solution
(3.6)
dt
dy
= ± 1√
G(y) + v2
,
where G(y) = 14y
4 + 2η|y|3 + 4η2y2 − y2.
When y ≥ 0, the first order derivative of G is
G
′
(y) = y3 + 6ηy2 + 8η2y − 2y = y(y + 3η −
√
η2 + 2)(y + 3η +
√
η2 + 2).
It is then easy to conclude the following results
• If η ≥ 12 , the function G(y) is strictly increasing for y ≥ 0;
• If 0 ≤ η < 12 , the function G(y) decreases on the interval [0,
√
η2 + 2− 3η] and increases on
the interval [
√
η2 + 2− 3η,+∞);
• If η < 12 , |v| < v0, the function G(y) + v2 maybe negative for some y ∈ R. Let us denote by
y(v) the smallest positive root of G(y)+v2 = 0. Since the function y 7→ G(y) first decreases
to −v20 over the interval [0,
√
η2 + 2 − 3η], and then increasing to +∞ over the interval
[
√
η2 + 2− 3η,+∞), we know that the function y 7→ G(y) + v2 decreases over [0, y(v)) and
crosses 0 at y(v), which implies that y(v) is a simple root.
Let v0 :=
√
−G(
√
η2 + 2− 3η) if η < 12 . and
(3.7) T (v) :=
∫ y(v)
0
dz√
G(z) + v2
, v ∈ (0, v0),
whose role will be clear in the next result.
Lemma 3.1. The following properties hold for solutions yv(.),
• yv(.) is strictly increasing if v > 0, strictly decreasing if v < 0, identically 0 if v = 0;
• If either η ≥ 12 , v ∈ R or η < 12 , |v| ≥ v0, then the solution yv(t) < +∞ if and only if
t <
∫ +∞
0
dz√
G(z)+v2
. Furthermore, yv(.) is strictly increasing if v > 0, strictly decreasing if
v < 0;
• If η < 12 , |v| ∈ (0, v0), the solution yv(.) is a periodic function.
Proof. The first statement is clear. We prove the rest by writing down the unique C1 solution
explicitly.
If either η ≥ 12 , v ∈ R or η < 12 , |v| ≥ v0, then G(z) + v2 ≥ 0 for any z ∈ R and thus we obtain
from (3.6) that
t = sign(v)
∫ y
0
dz√
G(z) + v2
.
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Since the function y 7→ ∫ y0 dz√G(z)+v2 is strictly increasing, for any t < ∫ +∞0 dz√G(z)+v2 , we can find
a unique yv(t) such that
t =
∫ yv(t)
0
dz√
G(z) + v2
.
It can be seen that the function t 7→ yv(t) is C1, and therefore is the unique solution to (3.4).
Since G(yv(t))+v
2 is always nonnegative, the solution yv(t) must oscillate between [−y(v), y(v)].
For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T (v), there exists a unique yv(t) such that
t =
∫ yv(t)
0
dz√
G(z) + v2
.
Define a periodic function, still denoted by yv(.),
yv(t) =


yv(t− 4kT (v)) t ∈ [4kT (v), (4k + 1)T (v)),
yv((4k + 2)T (v) − t) t ∈ [(4k + 1)T (v), (4k + 2)T (v)),
−yv(t− (4k + 2)T (v)) t ∈ [(4k + 2)T (v), (4k + 3)T (v)),
−yv((4k + 4)T (v) − t) t ∈ [(4k + 3)T (v), (4k + 4)T (v)).
It can be easily seen that yv(t) is the unique C1 solution to (3.4). 
Proposition 3.1. If η ≥ 12 , then xv(T ) is strictly increasing with respect to v and therefore (3.4)
has unique solution.
Proof. It can be seen that both of the equation (3.4) and the function v 7→ xv(T ) are odd. Therefore
y−v(.) = −yv(.), x−v(T ) = −xv(T ), and we only need to prove the proposition for v ≥ 0.
The strictly decreasing function v 7→ ∫ +∞0 dz√G(z)+v2 approaches +∞ as v → 0, approaches 0 as
v → +∞. Therefore any positive T there exists a unique u > 0 such that∫ +∞
0
dz√
G(z) + u2
= T.
As a result of Lemma 3.1, the solution yv(.) is finite at T if and only if v < u, and there exists a
unique yv(T ) > 0 such that
T =
∫ yv(T )
0
dz√
G(z) + v2
,
and also dyv
dt
|T =
√
G(yv(T )) + v2. Suppose 0 ≤ v1 < v2 < u. Due to the fact that G(z) + v21 <
G(z) + v22,∀z ∈ R, we obtain
yv1(T ) < yv2(T ),
d
dt
yv1(T ) <
d
dt
yv2(T ),
from which we can conclude xv1(T ) < xv2(T ). As a result of lim
v→u
yv(T ) = +∞, we obtain
lim
v→u
xv(T ) = +∞, and thus there exists a unique solution to (3.4) for any 2θ¯ − 1 ∈ R.

As a result of the above proposition, the mean field equation (3.1) may have multiple solutions
only if η < 12 . To find the number of solutions, we study the period of yv(.) in the following lemma.
Note that since y−v(t) = −yv(t) and y0(t) = 0, it suffices for us to consider the period of yv(.) for
v ∈ (0, v0).
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Lemma 3.2. Suppose 0 ≤ η < 12 , v ∈ (0, v0), and y(v) is the smallest postive root of z 7→ G(z)+v2.
Recall (3.7) and define
H(v) :=
∫ y(v)
v
dz√
G(z) + v2
.
Take T (v) = T (−v),H(v) = H(−v) if v ∈ (−v0, 0). Then both T (.) and H(.) are increasing with
respect to v over the interval (0, v0), and lim
v→v0
T (v) = +∞.
Proof. By the definition, we have G(y) + v2 = (y
2
2 +2η|y|)2 + v2 − y2, from which we can conclude
that y(v) ≥ v, and therefore H(v) is positive.
By change of variable p = z
y(v) , we obtain
T (v) =
∫
1
0
dp√
G(y(v)p)
y(v)2
+ v
2
y(v)2
=
∫
1
0
dp√
1
4y(v)
2p4 + 2ηy(v)p3 + (4η2 − 1)p2 + v2
y(v)2
.
Denote the square of the bottom of the integrand by P (v, p), i.e.,
P (v, p) :=
1
4
y(v)2p4 + 2ηy(v)p3 + (4η2 − 1)p2 + v
2
y(v)2
.
To prove T (v) is increasing, it suffices to show that P (v, p) is decreasing with respect to v for any
fixed p ∈ [0, 1].
Since y(v) is an increasing function of v, the derivative dP
dv
(v, p) is no larger than dP
dv
(v, 1), which
is equal to 0 according to the definition of y(v),
dP
dv
(v, 1) =
d(G(y(v)) + v2)
dv
= 0.
Therefore P (v1, p) ≥ P (v2, p) for any p ∈ [0, 1], 0 < v1 < v2 < v0.
We can also rewrite H(v) as
H(v) =
∫ 1
v
y(v)
dp√
P (v, p)
,
and it is enough to show that v 7→ v
y(v) is decreasing. Taking derivative of the following equation
with respect to v,
G(y(v)) + v2 = 0,
we get dy(v)
dv
= − 2v
G
′(y(v))
, and thus
d
dv
(
v
y(v)
) =
y(v)− v dy(v)
dv
y(v)2
=
y(v) + 2v
2
G
′(y(v))
y(v)2
.
As a result of dy(v)
dv
≥ 0, we obtain that G′(y(v)) < 0 and d
dv
( v
y(v) ) ≤ 0 is equivalent to G
′
(y(v))y(v)+
2v2 ≥ 0. We conclude our claim by the following computation,
G
′
(y(v))y(v) + 2v2 = G
′
(y(v))y(v) + 2v2 − 2(G(y(v)) + v2)
=
1
2
y(v)4 + 2ηy(v)3 > 0
In the end, it can be seen that the function z 7→ G(z) + v20 is always positive over the interval
[0,+∞) and only attains 0 at z =
√
η2 + 2− 3η. Since G(z) + v20 is a polynomial, we obtain that
y(v0) =
√
η2 + 2− 3η, (z −
√
η2 + 2 + 3η)2 is a factor of G(z) + v20 , and hence
lim
v→v0
T (v) =
∫ √η2+2−3η
0
dz√
G(z) + v20
= +∞.
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
For each k ∈ N, define Tk(v) := (2k+1)T (v)+H(v) if |v| ∈ (0, v0), and Tk(v) := +∞ if |v| > v0.
Now we show that for v 6= 0, {Tk(v) : k ∈ N} is the time set such that xv(T ) attains 0 (Tk(v) = +∞
for |v| ≥ v0 simply implies that xv(t) never reaches 0 for those v). As a result of Lemma 3.1, the
function xv(T ) can equal to 0 only if η <
1
2 , |v| ∈ (0, v0) or v = 0. Setting xv(T ) = 0, by (3.5) we
get
0 = xv(T ) =
1
2
yv(T )|yv(T )|+ 2ηyv(T ) + d
dt
yv(T )
=
1
2
yv(T )|yv(T )|+ 2ηyv(T ) + sign( d
dt
yv(T ))
√
G(yv(T )) + v2.
Moving the last term to the left, taking square of both sides and plugging in the formula of G(y),
it becomes
(
1
2
yv(T )|yv(T )|+ 2ηyv(T ))2 + v2 − (yv(T ))2 = (1
2
yv(T )|yv(T )|+ 2ηyv(T ))2,
which is equivalent to v2 − (yv(T ))2 = 0. Therefore we obtain that |yv(T )| = v, sign(yv(T )) =
− sign( d
dt
yv(T )), from which we conclude that xv(T ) = 0 if and only if T = Tk(v) or v = 0.
Therefore T1(v) is the first time xv(t) reaches 0. Taking Tk(0+) := lim
v↓0
Tk(v), it can be seen that
for t ≤ T1(0+), v 6= 0, we have xv(t) 6= 0. Before computing the number of solutions, we still need
one more result, which is also important for us to construct the entropy solution of the master
equation in the next section.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose η < 12 . Then for any (x, t) ∈ R × R+ \ {0} × R+, there exists a unique
v(x, t) ∈ R+ such that xv(t) = x, t < T1(v) (simply take v(x, t) = 0 if x = 0).
Proof. Step 1. For any 0 < v1 < v2 ≤ v0, we prove that yv1(t) < yv2(t),∀t ∈ (0, T1(v1)]. Otherwise
suppose yv1(t) = yv2(t) for some t ∈ (0, T1(v1)]. If t ≤ T (v1), as in the proof of Lemma 3.1 we have
(3.8) t =
∫ yv1 (t)
0
dz√
G(z) + v21
=
∫ yv2 (t)
0
dz√
G(z) + v22
,
which is impossible since G(z) + v21 < G(z) + v
2
2 . If t ∈ (T (v1), T (v2)], then yv2(t) > yv2(T (v1)) >
yv1(T (v1)) > yv1(t), which is contradictory to our assumption. If t ∈ (T (v2), T1(v1)], we have
2T (v1)− t =
∫ yv1 (t)
0
dz√
G(z) + v21
>
∫ yv2 (t)
0
dz√
G(z) + v22
= 2T (v2)− t,
which contradicts to Lemma 3.2.
Step 2. For any v0 ≤ v1 < v2, t ∈
(
0,
∫ +∞
0
dz√
G(z)+v2
]
, we have yv1(t) < yv2(t), which can be
proved as in Step 1.
Step 3. For any 0 < v1 < v2 ≤ v0, we prove that xv1(t) < xv2(t),∀t ∈ [0, T1(v1)]. Otherwise
suppose t = sup{t : xv1(t) = xv2(t), t ≤ T1(v1)}, where supreme is attained by the continuity of
xv1(.) and xv2(.). To show the contradiction, we prove that
d
dt
(xv2(t) − xv1(t)) < 0, in which case
these two curves have to intersect after time t since xv2 decreases to 0 at time T1(v2) > T1(v1).
If t ≥ T (v1), we have
xv1(t) =
1
2
yv1(t)
2 + 2ηyv1(t)−
√
G(yv1(t)) + v
2
1
=
1
2
yv2(t)
2 + 2ηyv2(t) + sign(
d
dt
yv2(t))
√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2 = xv2(t).
Since we proved yv1(t) < yv2(t), the derivative
d
dt
yv2(t) must be negative, and hence
(3.9)
1
2
yv1(t)
2 + 2ηyv1(t)−
√
G(yv1(t)) + v
2
1 =
1
2
yv2(t)
2 + 2ηyv2(t)−
√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2 .
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Combining (3.9) and d
dt
yvi(t) = −
√
G(yvi(t)) + v
2
i , i = 1, 2 , we obtain
d
dt
(xv2(t)− xv1(t)) =yv1(t)
(√
G(yv1(t)) + v
2
1 −
1
2
yv1(t)
2 − 2ηyv1(t) + 1)
)
− yv2(t)
(√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2 −
1
2
yv2(t)
2 − 2ηyv2(t) + 1)
)
.
Because of (3.9) and the fact that yv2(t) > yv1(t), we deduce that
d
dt
(xv2(t)−xv1(t)) < 0 is equivalent
to
√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2 − 12yv2(t)2 − 2ηyv2(t) + 1 > 0, which is true since√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2 −
1
2
yv2(t)
2 − 2ηyv2(t) + 1 > −
1
2
yv2(t)
2 − 2ηyv2(t) + 1
> −1
2
(
√
η2 + 2− 3η)2 − 2η(
√
η2 + 2− 3η) + 1 > 0.
If t < T (v1), by the same reasoning we have
1
2
yv1(t)
2 + 2ηyv1(t) +
√
G(yv1(t)) + v
2
1 =
1
2
yv2(t)
2 + 2ηyv2(t) +
√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2,
and also
d
dt
(xv2(t)− xv1(t)) =yv2(t)
(√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2 +
1
2
yv2(t)
2 + 2ηyv2(t)− 1
)
− yv1(t)
(√
G(yv1(t)) + v
2
1 +
1
2
yv1(t)
2 + 2ηyv1(t)− 1
)
.
Accordingly, it suffices to show that
(√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2 +
1
2yv2(t)
2 + 2ηyv2(t) − 1
)
< 0, which is
equivalent to
(3.10)
√
G(yv2(t)) + v
2
2 < 1−
1
2
yv2(t)
2 − 2ηyv2(t).
Taking square of (3.10) , we obtain the equivalent inequality v22 + 4ηyv2(t)− 1 < 0. Since yv2(t) ≤
y(v2), we conclude our claim by the following computation
v22 + 4ηyv2(t)− 1 ≤v22 + 4ηy(v2)− 1 = −G(y(v2)) + 4ηy(v2)− 1
=− (1
2
y(v2)
2 + 2ηy(v2)− 1)2 < 0.
Step 4. For any v0 ≤ v1 < v2, t ∈
(
0,
∫ +∞
0
dz√
G(z)+v2
]
, we have xv1(t) < xv2(t), which can be
proved as in Step 3.
Step 5. Until now we have shown that the stopped curves {xv(t) : 0 ≤ t < T1(v)} do not
intersect, and it remains to prove that for any (x, t) ∈ R+ × R+, there exists a v(x, t) ∈ R+ such
that xv(t) = x, t < T1(v). Note that according to (3.4), for any fixed t, the couple (yv(t),
d
dt
yv(t)) is
continuous with respect to the initial velocity v, and thus the mapping v 7→ xv(t) is also continuous.
First suppose x < xv0(t) and t ≤ T1(0+). As a result of lim
v→0
xv(t) = 0, lim
v→v0
xv(t) = xv0(t) and
the continuity of v 7→ xv(t), we know that there must exist some v ∈ (0, v0) such that xv(t) = x.
The equality t < T1(v) simply follows from the inequality t ≤ T1(0+) < T1(v).
Suppose x < xv0(t) and t > T1(0+). Since T1(v) increases to +∞ as v increases to v0, we know
that there exists a unique v′ ∈ (0, v0) such that t = T1(v′), which also implies xv′(t) = 0. According
to the continuity of v′ 7→ xv′(t), and the fact that lim
v→v0
xv(t) = xv0(t), we know there must exist a
v > v′ such that xv(t) = x, and t = T1(v
′) < T1(v).
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In the end suppose x > xv0(t). Because the mapping v 7→
∫ +∞
0
dz√
G(z)+v2
is decreasing from +∞
to 0 over the interval (v0,+∞), there exists a unique v′ > v0 such that
∫ +∞
0
dz√
G(z)+v′2
= t, which
also implies xv′(t) = +∞. Again by the continuity of v 7→ xv(t) and the fact that lim
v→v0
xv(t) =
xv0(t) < x, there exists a v > v0 such that xv(t) = x. 
Proposition 3.2. Suppose η < 12 . Then there exists a unique solution to (3.4) for any T > 0
if |2θ¯ − 1| ≥ 1 − η2 − η
√
η2 + 2, and the number of solutions to (3.4) can be arbitrarily large if
|2θ¯ − 1| < 1 − η2 − η
√
η2 + 2 and T is large enough. In particular, the number of solutions with
boundary condition 2θ¯ − 1 = 0 is given by
1 + 2 sup
k∈N
{k : Tk(0+) < T}.
Proof. Recalling v0 =
√
−G(
√
η2 + 2− 3η), we first prove that xv0(t) is increasing with respect to
t and lim
t→+∞
xv0(t) = 1− η2 − η
√
η2 + 2.
Taking derivative of the following equation,
xv0(t) =
1
2
yv0(t)yv0(t) + 2ηyv0(t) +
d
dt
yv0(t),
we get d
dt
xv0(t) = (yv0(t) + 2η)
d
dt
yv0(t) +
1
2G
′
(yv0(t)). Therefore xv0(t) is increasing is equivalent to
(3.11) (yv0(t) + 2η)
d
dt
yv0(t) ≥ −
1
2
G
′
(yv0(t)).
Since both sides of (3.11) are positive, it is enough to show that
(yv0(t) + 2η)
2(
d
dt
yv0(t))
2 − 1
4
(G
′
(yv0(t)))
2 > 0.
Plugging in the equality d
dt
yv0(t) =
√
G(yv0(t)) + v
2
0 and the formula of G, the inequality becomes
2η(yv0(t))
3 + (4η2 − 1 + v20)(yv0(t))2 + 4ηv20yv0(t) + 4η2v20 ≥ 0.
Now we finish proving xv0(t) is increasing by the following equality,
2η(yv0(t))
3 + (4η2 − 1 + v20)(yv0(t))2 + 4ηv20yv0(t) + 4η2v20
= (yv0(t)−
√
η2 + 2 + 3η)2
(
2ηy +
4η2v20
(
√
η2 + 2− 3η)2
)
Recall Lemma 3.1, yv0(t) is given by the equation
t =
∫ yv0 (t)
0
dz√
G(z) + v20
.
Combining the equality proved in Lemma 3.2 that
∫√η2+2−3η
0
dz√
G(z)+v20
= +∞, we conclude that
lim
t→+∞
yv0(t) =
√
η2 + 2− 3η. Also, according to (3.6), we get that
lim
t→+∞
d
dt
yv0(t) =
√
G(
√
η2 + 2− 3η) + v20 = 0.
Therefore by (3.5), we conclude the second claim
lim
t→+∞
xv0(t) =
1
2
(
√
η2 + 2− 3η)2 + 2η(
√
η2 + 2− 3η) = 1− η2 − η
√
η2 + 2.
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It can be seen that the curves {xv(t) : t ≥ 0, v ≥ v0} never cross each other, and that xv(t) <
1 − η2 − η
√
η2 + 2 for any t > 0 if v < v0. Therefore according to Lemma 3.3, if |2θ¯ − 1| ≥
1− η2 − η
√
η2 + 2, there exists only one v ≥ v0 such that xv(T ) = 2θ¯ − 1.
Now suppose that 0 < 2θ¯ − 1 < 1− η2 − η
√
η2 + 2. For each v ∈ (0, v0), define
M(v) := max
t≥0
xv(t).
As a result of Lemma 3.3, M(v) is actually an increasing function, and there exists a unique
v¯ ∈ (0, v0) such that M(v¯) = 2θ¯ − 1. Also for any v ∈ [v¯, v0), we can define t(v) as the unique t
satisfying xv(t) = 2θ¯−1, t < T1(v), which is also an increasing function of v. Then (xv(.), yv(.)) is a
solution of (3.3) with time horizon T = t(v). Since the period of xv(.) is 4T (v), and lim
v→v0
t(v) = +∞,
for each k ∈ N we know that if T > t(v¯) + 4kT (v¯), there must exist some v′ ∈ [v¯, v0) such that
T = t(v′)+4kT (v′). Therefore we conclude that the number of solutions to (3.3) with time horizon
T is greater than
sup
k∈N
{k : T ≥ t(v¯) + 4kT (v¯)},
which can be arbitrarily large if T is large enough.
In the end, we consider the number of solutions for the terminal condition 2θ¯ − 1 = 0. We
have already shown that Tk(v) is the time when xv(t) attains zero. According to Lemma 3.2, the
functions Tk(v) are increasing with respect to v for each k ∈ N and lim
v→v0
Tk(v) = +∞. Since
x−v(t) = −xv(t), and v = 0 is always a solution, the number of solutions is just
1 + 2{(k, v) : Tk(v) = T, k ∈ N, v ∈ (0, v0)} = 1 + 2 sup
k∈N
{k : Tk(0+) < T}.

4. The Master Equation
Letting Y (t, θ) = U(t, 1, θ)− U(t, 0, θ), x = 2θ − 1, and time reverse the master equation (ME),
we obtain the closed equation
(4.1)
∂Y
∂t
+
∂
∂x
(
2ηxY +
xY |Y |
2
− Y
2
2
− x
2
2
)
= 0,
with the boundary condition Y (0, x) = 0,∀x ∈ [−1, 1].
Since the equation has the form of a scalar conservation law, there exists a unique entropy
solution. By the method of characteristics, we directly construct a piecewise C1 solution to (4.1)
and then check it is entropic.
Rewriting (4.1) as
∂Y
∂t
+
∂Y
∂x
(2ηx− Y + x|Y |) = −2ηY − Y |Y |
2
+ x,
and letting y(t) = Y (t, x(t)), d
dt
x = 2ηx− y + x|y|, we obtain the characteristic curve of (4.1)

d
dt
x = 2ηx− y + x|y|,
d
dt
y = −2ηy − y|y|2 + x,
y(0) = 0, x(0) = dy
dt
(0),
whose solution is given explicitly in Lemma 3.1. If η ≥ 12 , the solution given by characteristic
curves is smooth everywhere. If η < 12 , the shock curve is taken to be γ(t) = 0, t ∈ R+. See our
illustration in Figure 1.
Proposition 4.1. The function Y (x, t) := yv(x,t)(t) is the entropy solution of (4.1) with shock
curve γ(t) = 0, t > T1(0+), where v(x, t) ∈ R is defined in Lemma 3.3.
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Figure 1. Characteristic curves, η = 0.1, T = 3 on the left; η = 0.6, T = 1 on the right.
Proof. It is clear that the function Y (x, t) is C1 outside the shock curve, and we only need to check
the Rankine-Hugoniot condition and the Lax condition (see [6, Proposition 3]). Define
Y+(t) := lim
x↓0
Y (x, t), Y− := lim
x↑0
Y (x, t).
If t > T1(0+), there exists a v > 0 such that t = T1(v) since v 7→ T1(v) is increasing to +∞
as v increases to v0. Also it can be seen that lim
x↓0
v(x, t) = v. According to the discussion above
Lemma 3.3, we conclude that Y+(t) = yv(t) = v = lim
x↓0
v(x, t), and similarly Y−(t) = − lim
x↓0
v(x, t).
If t ≤ T1(0+), the mapping v 7→ xv(t) is continuous and strictly increasing, which is zero at v = 0.
Therefore lim
x↓0
v(x, t) = 0, and Y+(t) = Y−(t) = 0. In summary, we have
Y+(t) = −Y−(t) =


lim
x↓0
v(x, t) if t > T1(0+),
0 if t ≤ T1(0+).
Taking g(x, Y ) = 2ηxY + xY |Y |2 − Y
2
2 − x
2
2 , we have
d
dt
γ(t) = 0 =
− (Y+(t))22 + (Y−(t))
2
2
Y+(t)− Y−(t) =
g(γ(t), Y+(t))− g(γ(t), Y−(t))
Y+(t)− Y−(t) ,
which verifies the Rankine-Hugoniot condition.
For any c strictly between Y−(t) and Y+(t), t > T1(0+), we have
g(γ(t), c) − g(γ(t), Y+(t))
c− Y+(t) =
(Y+(t))2
2 − c
2
2
c− Y+(t) = −
c+ Y+(t)
2
,
g(γ(t), c) − g(γ(t), Y−(t))
c− Y−(t) ==
(Y−(t))2
2 − c
2
2
c− Y−(t) = −
c+ Y−(t)
2
,
and therefore
g(γ(t), c) − g(γ(t), Y+(t))
c− Y+(t) <
d
dt
γ(t) = 0 <
g(γ(t), c) − g(γ(t), Y−(t))
c− Y−(t) ,
which verifies the Lax condition. 
Remark 4.1. It is easily seen that the entropy solution of (4.1) corresponds to a solution of (ME).
Remark 4.2. By Lemma 3.3, we know that for any θ¯ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique v′ such that
xv′ (T ) = 2θ¯ − 1, T < T1(v
′
). Then (xv′ (T − t), yv′ (T − t)) solves (3.1), which is the mean field
equilibrium induced the entropy solution.
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5. N + 1-player game and the selection of Equilibrium
In this section, we consider the N + 1-player game and always assume η = 0. Since the model
we are considering is invariant under permutation, it can be easily seen that
V N+1(t, 0, 1 − θ) = V N+1(t, 1, θ),
and therefore we only need to consider the HJB systems for V N+1(t, 1, θ):
(5.1)


− d
dt
V N+1(t, 1, θ) = f(1, θ)− (αN+1∗ (t,1,θ))22
+N(1− θ)αN+1∗ (t, 1, θ)(V N+1(t, 1, θ + 1N )− V N+1(t, 1, θ))
+NθαN+1∗ (t, 0, θ − 1N )(V N+1(t, 1, θ − 1N )− V N+1(t, 1, θ))
V N+1(T, 1, θ) = 0,
where the optimal control policy is
aN+1∗ (t, i, θ) = (V
N+1(t, i, θ)− V N+1(t, 1− i, θ))+.
As a result of the local Lipschitz continuity of the HJB equation (5.1), the system can be uniquely
solved with terminal condition V N+1(T, 0, θ) = 0, which provides us the unique Nash Equilibrium
of the game. Supposing that the representative player is applying the zero control while the other
players are taking the optimal policy, then by the definition of Nash Equilibrium we conclude that
V N+1(t, 1, θ) ≤ E
[∫ T
t
f(i(t), θt)dt
]
≤ T − t.
Now we prove that if the representative player agrees with the majority, then he will keep his state
by taking the zero control.
Proposition 5.1. Taking
Y N+1(t, θ) = V N+1(t, 1, θ)− V N+1(t, 0, θ) = V N+1(t, 1, θ)− V N+1(t, 1, 1 − θ),
for any θ ∈ {0, 1
N
, . . . , 1} we have
(5.2)
Y N+1(t, θ) ≥ 0 (αN+1∗ (t, 0, θ) = 0) if θ ≥
1
2
,
Y N+1(t, θ) ≤ 0 (αN+1∗ (t, 1, θ) = 0) if θ ≤
1
2
.
Proof. We only prove the first inequality of (5.2) for even N , and the rest can be proved similarly.
As a result of Y N+1(t, 12) = 0, it is enough for us to show it for θ ≥ 12 + 1N . Take
WN+1(t, θ) = V N+1(t, 1, θ)− V N+1(t, 1, θ − 1
N
).
According to (5.1), we obtain
(5.3)
d
dt
Y N+1(t, θ) = 1− 2θ + |Y
N+1(t, θ)|Y N+1(t, θ)
2
+Nθ
(
Y N+1(t, θ − 1
N
)−W
N+1(t, θ) + Y N+1(t, θ)−W
N+1(t, 1 − θ + 1
N
)
)
−N(1− θ)
(
Y N+1(t, θ)+W
N+1(t, θ +
1
N
) + Y N+1(t, θ +
1
N
)+W
N+1(t, 1− θ)
)
,
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and
(5.4)
d
dt
WN+1(t, 1− θ) =− 1
N
+
Y N+1(t, 1− θ)2+
2
− Y
N+1(t, 1− θ − 1
N
)2+
2
−NθY N+1(t, 1− θ)+WN+1(t, 1− θ + 1
N
)
+N(1− θ)Y N+1(t, 1− θ − 1
N
)−W
N+1(t, 1− θ)
+N(θ +
1
N
)Y N+1(t, 1− θ − 1
N
)+W
N+1(t, 1− θ)
−N(1− θ − 1
N
)Y N+1(t, 1 − θ − 2
N
)−W
N+1(t, 1− θ − 1
N
).
By our terminal condition V N+1(T, 1, θ) = 0, it is easy to see that Y N+1(T, θ) = WN+1(T, θ) = 0,
and both d
dt
Y N+1(T, θ), d
dt
WN+1(T, 1− θ) are negative if θ > 12 . And therefore by the continuity of
V N+1(t, 1, θ), there exists a small positive ǫ > 0 such that Y N+1(t, θ),WN+1(t, 1 − θ) are positive
during the time interval [T − ǫ, T ). Define
s := sup
{t<T−ǫ}
{t :WN+1(t, 1− θ) = 0 or Y N+1(t, θ) = 0 for some θ > 1
2
}.
We finish the argument by showing that Y N+1(t, θ) and WN+1(t, 1 − θ) are both positive for
t ∈ [s, T − ǫ], θ > 12 , which implies s has to be −∞. By the definition of s, we have Y N+1(t, θ) =
−Y N+1(t, 1 − θ) ≥ 0,WN+1(t, 1 − θ) ≥ 0 if t ∈ [s, T − ǫ), θ > 12 , and therefore we obtain the
following inequality from (5.3),
d
dt
Y N+1(t, θ) ≤ Y N+1(t, θ)
(
Y N+1(t, θ)
2
−N(1− θ)WN+1(t, θ + 1
N
)
)
.
Since V N+1(t, 1, θ) ≤ T , we get that |Y N+1(t, θ)| ≤ 2T , |WN+1(t, θ)| ≤ 2T for any θ ∈ {0, 1
N
, . . . , 1}.
Therefore Y N+1(t, θ) is bounded below by the solution of{
d
dt
l(t) = (T + 2NT )l(t)
l(T − ǫ) = Y N+1(T − ǫ, θ),
which is always positive. Similarly, for t ∈ [s, T − ǫ], θ > 12 , we obtain the inequality from (5.4)
d
dt
WN+1(t, 1− θ) ≤ N(1− θ)Y N+1(t, 1− θ − 1
N
)−W
N+1(t, 1 − θ) ≤ 2NT (1 − θ)WN+1(t, 1− θ),
which implies WN+1(t, 1− θ) > 0 for t ∈ [s, T − ǫ]. 
Remark 5.1. Recall that Z(t) is the state of the N +1 players at time t when agents play the Nash
equilibrium given by (HJB). Denote by θN+1(t) the fraction of players at state 0, i.e.,
θN+1(t) =
1
N + 1
N+1∑
j=1
δZj(t)=0.
and let U be the solution of (ME) corresponding to the entropy solution of (4.1). According to
Proposition 5.1, θN+1(t) will always stay on one side of 12 if θ
N+1(0) 6= 12 . In combination with
the fact that U(t, i, θ) is smooth outside the curve γ¯(t) = 12 , it can be easily seen that V
N+1(t, 1, θ)
converges to U(t, 1, θ) if θ 6= 12 (see e.g. [6, Theorem 8] ).
Let (ξj)j∈N be the i.i.d initial datum of Zj such that P[ξj = 0] = θ¯ 6= 12 ,P[ξj = 1] = 1 − θ¯.
Denote by Z˜j the i.i.d process in which players choose the optimal control α˜(t, i) := (U(t, i, θ(t)) −
U(t, 1− i, θ(t)))+, where U is the corresponding entropy solution of (ME). Also, we can prove the
propagation of chaos property by using the technique developed in [5] and [6].
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6. Conclusion
When η > 1/2, the N-player game converges to the mean field game following the analysis of
[1] and [5]. Here we considered the case when η = 0 and showed that the N-player game value
functions converge to the entropic mean-field game solution and verified in this case the conjecture
of [7].
When η ∈ (0, 12), it is always possible for players to jump to the other state. Therefore θN+1(t)
may not always stay on one side of 12 , and when we use Itoˆ’s formula to the entropy solution U ,
there would be extra jump terms. Subsequently our strategy does not work when η ∈ (0, 1/2), and
new techniques are needed. We leave this as an open problem.
When θ¯ = 1/2, it is expected that the N player limit will charge the two solutions we obtain with
equal probability (as in [7]), which is numerically justified by the Figure 3 of [9]. Hence in that
case the N -player empirical distribution will not converge to the stable fixed points of the MFG
map (in the language of [7]) unlike what is claimed in the conjecture.
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